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INTRODUCTION
Nobody wants to be manipulated. Yet speakers have long sought to manipulate
their listeners1in other words, to covertly influence their listeners decision-making
to the speakers advantage without those listeners conscious awareness. 2 As one of
many examples, think of subliminal advertising, where sellers embed a visual message within an advertisement for a time too brief for the viewers conscious mind
to comprehend.3
* University Distinguished Professor and Rothgerber Chair in Constitutional Law, University of Colorado School of Law. Thanks to Ellen Miller for excellent research assistance.
Thanks too for thoughtful questions and comments from Enrique Armijo, Elettra Bietti, Caroline
Mala Corbin, Margot Kaminski, Kyle Langvardt, Migle Laukyte, Francesca Procaccini, Harry
Surden, Jeremy Telman, Alex Tsesis, and the participants at the William & Mary Bill of Rights
Journal Symposium on Algorithms and the Bill of Rights and at the Free Expression Scholars
Conference at Yale Law School.
1
See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277, 1280
(2014) (describing appeals to emotion that rise to the level of manipulation when they intentionally take[] advantage of common cognitive heuristicscognitive shortcuts that are both
helpful and distortingthat we all fall prey to); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking
Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420,
142829 (1999) (describing various longstanding techniques for manipulative advertising);
see also Tamara R. Piety, Merchants of Discontent: An Exploration of the Psychology of
Advertising, Addiction, and the Implications for Commercial Speech, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
377, 40722, 43233, 435, 43741 (2001) (exploring manipulative technology).
2
See Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler & Helen Nissenbaum, Online Manipulation: Hidden
Influences in a Digital World, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 1, 26 (2019) (defining manipulation).
3
See Laura R. Salpeter & Jennifer I. Swirsky, Historical and Legal Implications of Subliminal Messaging in the Multimedia: Unconscious Subjects, 36 NOVA L. REV. 497, 504 (2012).
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Empowered by the ability to collect and aggregate information about users and
then to tailor messages designed to shape those users responses, todays digital technologies can facilitate manipulation unprecedented in its reach and success. [T]he
more information a would-be manipulator has about a persons specific vulnerabilities,
the more capably they can exploit them, ethicists Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler and
Helen Nissenbaum observe.4 Rather than aiming only to exploit vulnerabilities
almost all of us share, as television advertisements and static billboards often attempt
to do, online manipulation targets individuals, exploiting vulnerabilities specific to
them.5 Contemporary technologies thus enable manipulation different in both degree
and in kind from more traditional forms of manipulation.
As one of many illustrations of twenty-first-century manipulation, consider sellers new ability to monitor changes in the speed and accuracy of your keyboarding
to determine when you may be tired or even intoxicated (and thus potentially impaired in your decision-making) and then to craft specific advertisements targeted to
exploit that vulnerability.6 Examples abound in the political context as well: recall,
for instance, Russian operatives use of data collection and algorithms to target
African Americans with personalized messages intended to induce them not to vote
in the 2016 U.S. elections.7
This Article examines new conceptual tools for understanding manipulation and
its harms. More specifically, Part I draws from ethicists insights to explain how
manipulation can inflict harms distinct from those imposed by coercion and deception, and to explain why addressing these distinct harms is a government interest
sufficiently strong to justify appropriately tailored interventions.8
Part II explores how these conceptual tools also help us understand when, how,
and why government can regulate manipulation consistent with the First Amendment. As a threshold matter, note that manipulative online interfaces and related
design choices may be better understood as conduct, rather than speech protected
by the First Amendment.9 When we recall that the First Amendment fails to cover,
4

Susser, Roessler & Nissenbaum, supra note 2, at 41.
Id.
6
See Lauren E. Willis, Deception By Design, 34 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 115, 143 (2020).
7
See Spencer Overton, State Power to Regulate Social Media Companies to Prevent
Voter Suppression, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1793, 179596 (2020).
8
While I acknowledge that all forms of manipulation can be harmful, I note that the
dangers of online manipulation differ in degree (and perhaps in kind) in ways that especially
warrant governmental intervention.
9
E.g., Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 103637
(2014) (questioning whether the collection and use of data in this context is speech covered
by the First Amendment); Julie E. Cohen, Tailoring Election Regulation: The Platform is the
Frame, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 641, 642 n.1 (2020) (I disagree that the First Amendment does
or should apply to information processing activities regardless of their nature and context,
but that is a subject for a different occasion.); Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Habit-Forming
Technology, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 129, 133 (2019) ([C]ourts have hardly begun to address
5
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much less protect, every use of language,10 one can plausibly understand the First
Amendments coverage to exclude data collection and the use of algorithms (that is,
instructions to machines) because they do things rather than say things.11 This
important possibility deserves attention and consideration. This Article, however,
assumes arguendo that courts may characterize the sorts of manipulative practices
discussed here as speech covered by the First Amendment, and then explores the
constitutional implications of that assumption.
First Amendment law sometimes permits the government to protect comparatively vulnerable listeners from comparatively powerful speakers false or misleading
speech, nondisclosures, or coercion. Think, for example, of the governments requirements that commercial actors provide accurate disclosures about their products
like laws requiring warnings about the dangers of tobacco on cigarette packages and
advertisements, and nutritional labels on food packaging.12
In other words, differences in power and information sometimes matter to First
Amendment law, permitting the governments interventions to protect comparatively vulnerable listeners. The same can and should be true of efforts to regulate
manipulative speech. This Article proposes understanding the First Amendment to
permit the government to intervene to protect listeners from speakers manipulative
efforts in certain settings.13
In commercial settings, more specifically, the Court should refine and extend
commercial speech doctrine to add manipulative commercial speech to the commercial speech it currently treats as entirely unprotected by the First Amendment
because it frustrates listeners interests.14 This move tracks the original theoretical
justifications of the commercial speech doctrine as steeped in protecting listeners
First Amendment interests. When one recalls that false and misleading commercial
speech, as well as commercial speech related to illegal activity, loses its First Amendment protection precisely because it frustrates listeners First Amendment interests,15
the First Amendment status of softwares technical and nonexpressive components.); Tim
Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 151825 (2013) (urging that we be slow to
characterize these products as speech for First Amendment purposes).
10
See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 177374 (2004).
11
See KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LIBERTIES OF SPEECH 6 (Princeton Univ. Press., 1995) (describing situation-altering speech as
speech that falls outside of the First Amendments protection because it does something rather
than just says something).
12
15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2018).
13
See Susser, Roessler & Nissenbaum, supra note 2, at 20 (The hiddenness of manipulative
influences explains how it is possible to alienate someone from their own decision-making
powers. In order to get someone to act the way you want without realizing why they are acting
that way, they must be unaware of the influence.).
14
See Langvardt, supra note 9, at 183.
15
See Schauer, supra note 10, at 1776.
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one sees that the same can be true of manipulative commercial speech: it frustrates
listeners interests by seeking to covertly influence those listeners choices without
their conscious awareness and by targeting and exploiting their vulnerabilities.
Filling this doctrinal lacuna would also help fill enforcement lacunae within current
law. Even though existing consumer protection statutes frequently prohibit unfair
as well as deceptive trade practices, to date enforcement efforts have focused almost
entirely on allegedly deceptive practiceslargely because of the conceptual difficulty in defining and describing illegally unfair practices.16 Here too ethicists provide
conceptual tools that explain why manipulation can be regarded as unfair to listeners
even when it is hard to characterize as deceptive in traditional terms.17
This then requires a workable principle for identifying online commercial speech
that is manipulative (and thus unprotected by the First Amendment). To this end, this
Article considers two possibilities: a) focusing on evidence of interfaces manipulative success in changing consumers choices; and b) targeting interfaces that display
key manipulative features that increase the risk of manipulation.
Finally, this Article briefly examines how online manipulation in the political
setting poses harms of its own that may also justify appropriately tailored regulatory
intervention (even while recognizing that the First Amendment barriers to such
regulation are significantly greater in this context than in the commercial setting) and
closes by highlighting some possible interventions that deserve further consideration.
I. UNDERSTANDING MANIPULATION AND ITS HARMS
Thinkers have long struggled to define the concept of manipulation with precision.18 This Part draws from thoughtful recent work co-authored by ethicists
Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler, and Helen Nissenbaum, who describe manipulation
as imposing a hidden or covert influence on another persons decision-making. 19
More specifically, they define manipulation as covertly influencing listeners decisionmaking by targeting and exploiting their decision-making vulnerabilities: That
means influencing someones beliefs, desires, emotions, habits, or behaviors without
their conscious awareness, or in ways that would thwart their capacity to become
consciously aware of it by undermining usually reliable assumptions.20 The key
16

See Piety, supra note 1, at 442.
See generally id.
18
See Shaun B. Spencer, The Problem of Online Manipulation, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. 959,
98488 (2020) (canvassing various efforts to define manipulation); Susser, Roessler &
Nissenbaum, supra note 2, at 12 (Manipulation is a tricky term, much like the behavior it
describes.).
19
See Susser, Roessler & Nissenbaum, supra note 2, at 26 (emphasis omitted).
20
Id. (emphasis omitted); see also id. (This definition captures what is essential about
manipulationnamely, that it disrupts the targets capacity for self-authorship. Which is to
say, it explains why, upon learning they have been manipulated, people feel like puppets.).
17
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features of manipulationas they define it, and as discussed hereare thus a
speakers hidden efforts to shape listeners decision-making that target and exploit
those listeners vulnerabilities in ways that the targets are not consciously aware of,
and in ways that those targets could not easily become aware of if they were to try. 21
To further understand the concept of manipulation, consider how it differs from
other efforts (some more ethical than others) to influence targets decision-making.
First, manipulation differs from both persuasion as well as coercion in that the
latter two efforts are apparent while manipulation is not. Susser, Roessler, and
Nissenbaum define persuasion as the forthright appeal to another persons decisionmaking power.22 And since coercion is blunt and forthright: one almost always
knows one is being coerced.23 In other words, both persuasion and coercion are
transparent efforts to influence the targetalthough to be sure, persuasion (as the
term is used here) is generally respectful of the targets autonomy while coercion is
not. But neither persuasion nor coercion is sneaky.
Manipulation, in contrast, is sneaky: [r]ather than simply depriving a person
of options as the coercer does, the manipulator infiltrates their decision-making
process, disposing it to the manipulators ends, which may or may not match their
own.24 So, for purposes of this Article, the terms manipulation, persuasion, and
coercion describe mutually exclusive concepts.25
Turn next to the relationship between manipulation and nudges, that is, interventions that steer people in particular directions but that also allow them to go
21

Id. at 24.
Id. at 3.
23
Id. at 17.
24
Id.; see also id. at 15 (Persuading someone leaves the choice of the matter entirely up
to them, while coercing someone robs them of choice. At the same time, although coercing
someone deprives them of choice, in an important sense, it leaves their capacity for conscious
decision-making intact. After all, recognizing that some incentive is irresistible, or that an
alternative is unacceptable, requires having our wits about us.).
25
Of course, speakers can and do use twenty-first-century expressive technologies not
only to manipulate but also to discriminate, or to coerce, hector and deluge unwilling listeners,
among other harms. See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, Manipulating Opportunity, 106 VA. L. REV.
867, 87071 (2020) ([O]nline intermediaries have the ability to precisely target an audience,
selecting some users to receive information and others to be excluded in ways that are not
at all transparent. . . . [W]hen predictive algorithms are used to allocate access to opportunities,
there is a significant risk that they will do so in a way that reproduces existing patterns of inequality and disadvantage.); Tony Romm, Robocalls Are Overwhelming Hospitals and Patients,
Threatening a New Kind of Health Crisis, WASH. POST (June 17, 2019), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/technology/2019/06/17/robocalls-are-overwhelming-hospitals-patients
-threatening-new-kind-health-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/7A4L-DQ2U] (describing how spam
robocalls that flood hospitals phone lines and squeeze out communications to patients
amount to a literal life-or-death challenge, one that increasingly is threatening doctors and
patients in a setting where every second can count. . . . [Hospital administrators] fear that
robocallers could eventually outmatch their best efforts to keep hospital phone lines free
during emergencies, creating the conditions for a potential health crisis.).
22
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their own way.26 Nudges may be or may not be manipulative, depending on whether
the nudger hides the intentions underlying, and the effects of, the nudge. As Cass
Sunstein explains, manipulative nudges are those that attempt to influence people
in a way that does not sufficiently engage or appeal to their capacities for reflective
and deliberative choice.27 Subliminal advertising is the classic example of the nontransparent, and thus manipulative, nudge.28
In contrast, nudges are not manipulative when they are transparent and when
they have the goal of increasing navigabilityof making it easier for people to get
to their preferred destination. Such nudges stem from an understanding that life can
be simple or hard to navigate, and a goal of helpful choice architecture is to promote
simpler navigation.29 Illustrations of non-manipulative nudges include nutrition
labels with calorie information, or utilities notices to us about how our home energy
use compares with that of our neighbors.30
Now consider the relationship between manipulation and deception. As Susser,
Roessler, and Nissenbaum explain, deception is a subset of the broader concept of
manipulation: deception is a particular type of covert effort to influence listeners
decision-making through false or misleading representations about objectively
verifiable facts.31 In the commercial context, for example, deception includes false
representations about the quality or hazards of goods and services, or about the actual
terms and conditions of a transaction. But manipulation is not limited to deception:
manipulation also includes a variety of hidden efforts to influence listeners decisionmaking that dont involve factual misrepresentations but instead exploit listeners
emotional, cognitive, or other vulnerabilities. This Article sets deception aside and
focuses instead on these other forms of manipulation. 32
26

Cass R. Sunstein, The Ethics of Nudging, 32 YALE J. REGUL. 413, 417 (2015). Sunstein
thus defines nudging and coercion to be mutually exclusive, in that the former avoids coercion or material incentives and thus fully maintains freedom of choice. Id. at 433.
27
Id. at 443 (emphasis omitted); see also Susser, Roessler & Nissenbaum, supra note 2,
at 2526 (Another distinction between nudges and manipulation . . . stems from the fact that
manipulation is usually targeted. In order to exploit someones vulnerabilities, one must know
something about what those vulnerabilities are and how precisely to leverage them. Most
nudges, by contrast, are not targeted to particular individuals.) (emphasis omitted).
28
Sunstein, supra note 26, at 44647.
29
Id. at 426 (emphasis omitted).
30
Id. at 425.
31
See Susser, Roessler & Nissenbaum, supra note 2, at 2122.
32
Elsewhere I have explored the harms of lies and other forms of deception, along with
the First Amendment implications of the governments efforts to address those harms. See,
e.g., Helen Norton, Lies and the Constitution, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 161; Helen Norton, Truth
and Lies in the Workplace: Employer Speech and the First Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 31
(2016) [hereinafter Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace]; Helen Norton, Lies to Manipulate,
Misappropriate, and Acquire Governmental Power, in LAW AND LIES: DECEPTION AND
TRUTH-TELLING IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM (Austin Sarat ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
2015); Helen Norton, (At Least) Thirteen Ways of Looking at Election Lies, 71 OKLA. L.
REV. 117 (2018).
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Twentieth-century exemplars of this sort of manipulation include subliminal
advertising,33 and sellers infusion of sweet scents throughout their stores that cause
consumers to linger longer and more happily.34 Law professors Jon Hanson and
Douglas Kysar have examined a wide range of additional twentieth-century examples of the possibility of market manipulationthat is, the possibility that market
outcomes can be influenced, if not determined, by the ability of one actor to control
the format of information, the framing and presentation of choices, and, more
generally, the setting within which market transactions occur.35
The many twenty-first-century examples of manipulation now include sellers
ability to target online advertisements to consumers when surveillance of social
media posts shows those consumers to be sad or lonely and thus especially vulnerable to buying certain goods and services they would not normally buyor to paying
higher prices than they would normally be willing to pay.36 And using webcams and
smartphone cameras to analyze consumers facial expressions as they looked at a
sales website and instantaneously deliver offers personalized to those consumers
nonverbal responses to the websites.37 And controlling the content of individuals
newsfeeds to steer their emotions to anger or fearemotional states associated with
barriers to careful decision-making.38
Twenty-first-century technologiesincluding the use of predictive algorithms
informed by the collection and analysis of huge amounts of datathus create
opportunities for manipulation different in both degree and in kind from more
traditional forms of manipulation. By running tens of thousands of consumers
through interfaces that were identical in every respect but one, firms can determine
exactly which interface, which text, which juxtapositions, and which graphics
maximize revenues. What was once an art is now a science, legal scholars Jamie
Luguri and Lior Strahilevitz explain.39 As a result, consumers ability to defend
themselves has degraded.40 Law professor Julie Cohen finds the same to be true in
33

See Sunstein, supra note 26, at 444.
See Shmuel I. Becher & Yuval Feldman, Manipulating, Fast and Slow: The Law of
Non-Verbal Market Manipulation, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 459, 475 (2016).
35
Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 630 (1999); see also id. at 748 (detailing how
manufacturers rely on behavioral research to shape consumers behavior).
36
See Langvardt, supra note 9, at 149; Willis, supra note 6, at 12223.
37
Willis, supra note 6, at 126.
38
Id. at 14447; see also Spencer, supra note 18, at 979 (describing technological developments that allow tech companies to detect and analyze users moods and then fashion
and deliver targeted responses).
39
Jamie Luguri & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Shining a Light on Dark Patterns, 13 J. LEG.
ANALYSIS 43, 103 (2021).
40
Id.; see also Langvardt, supra note 9, at 18485 ([T]hese firms actual product consists
in the ability to raise the odds that a targeted consumer will perform a desired action following a behavioral cue. At some point, through pervasive surveillance and conditioning and
34
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political settings: Manipulation in platform-based information environments is
neither occasional nor accidental; it is endemic and results from capabilities that
platforms systematically design, continually reoptimize, and deliberately offer up
to third parties for exploitation.41
These technological changes inspired law professor Ryan Calo to extend Hansons
and Kysars work to digital market manipulation that stands to generate dramatic
asymmetries of information and control between firms and consumers.42 In other
words, contemporary online manipulation not only exploits vulnerabilities but can
even create them. [D]igital market manipulation combines, for the first time, a
certain kind of personalization with the intense systemization made possible by
mediated consumption, Calo observes.43 A firm with the resources and inclination
will be in a position to surface and exploit how consumers tend to deviate from rational
decisionmaking on a previously unimaginable scale. Thus, firms will increasingly
be in the position to create suckers, rather than waiting for one to be born.44
Online manipulation is far from harmless. Manipulation injures listeners autonomy and welfare when it shapes those listeners choices to their economic and
other detriment. This is the case, for example, when a firm uses personal information to extract as much rent as possible from the consumer, Calo explains.45
[T]he consumer is shedding information that, without her knowledge or against her wishes, will be used to charge her as much
as possible, to sell her a product or service she does not need or
needs less of, or to convince her in a way that she would find
objectionable were she aware of the practice.46
The case for regulation becomes even stronger when we recall that manipulation, by definition, covertly targets and exploits users vulnerabilities, thus inflicting
harm that its targets cannot avoid through the traditional self-help remedies of
visual stimuli embedded in users contact lenses, some tech developers may become so good
at raising the odds of a purchase that probability approaches certainty . . . .); Willis, supra
note 6, at 128 (A 2014 experiment showed targeting marketing texts based on a model derived
by machine learning from past data resulted in thirteen times more conversions than targeting
texts based on variables selected by human marketers.).
41
Cohen, supra note 9, at 658.
42
Calo, supra note 9, at 9991000.
43
Id. at 1021 (emphasis omitted).
44
Id. at 1018 (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 1034 (The advancement in this Article
is to observe that intervention may be justified not only where a consumer is already
vulnerable, and firms are taking advantage, but also [] and indeed a fortiori [] where the firm
is leveraging what it knows about the consumer in order to purposefully render that specific
consumer vulnerable.).
45
Id. at 1029.
46
Id. at 1030.
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avoidance and counter-speech. For politics and law, a pervasive puzzle is why
manipulation is so rarely policed. The simplest answer is that manipulation has so
many shades, and in a social order that values free markets and consumer sovereignty, it is exceptionally difficult to regulate manipulation as such, Cass Sunstein
notes.47 But as the manipulators motives become more self-interested or venal, and
as efforts to bypass peoples deliberative capacities becomes more successful, the
ethical objections to manipulation may be very forceful, and the argument for a legal
response is fortified.48
Online manipulation is also far from inevitable. Instead, it is the product of conscious design choices, carefully studied and tested to maximize their effectiveness
in shaping targets choices without those targets conscious awareness, and deliberately unleashed to advantage some at the expense of others. Government and private
actors alike have made legal, policy, and design choices that have enabled increases
in online manipulation and its attendant harms.49 So too can we choose instead to
make legal, policy, and design decisions that deter and prevent these practices and
their harms.
Ethicists like Susser, Roessler, and Nissenbaum provide powerful conceptual tools
for thinking about these contemporary problems of manipulationand how they relate
to (and sometimes differ from) the problems of coercion and deception (and the nonproblem of persuasion). The next Part explores how these conceptual tools can also
explain when, why, and how the First Amendment permits the government to regulate manipulation.50
47

Cass R. Sunstein, Fifty Shades of Manipulation, 1 J. MKTG. BEHAV. 213, 213 (2015).
Id.; see also Susser, Roessler & Nissenbaum, supra note 2, at 44 ([B]ecause manipulation is, by our definition, hidden, combating it requires extra vigilance. The effects will often
only become apparent after the harm has already been done.) (emphasis omitted).
49
See Julie E. Cohen, Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 161
(2017) (As the networked information environment has redistributed control over reputational
development, powerful economic actors have worked to craft narratives that make unaccountability for certain types of information harms seem logical, inevitable, and right. They have
relied heavily on the U.S. [F]irst [A]mendment tradition, which characterizes the public sphere
as a marketplace of ideasan arena for neutral truth production through deliberate, reasoned
exchange, where the goods on offer can be evaluated on their merits, where the volume and quality of information are regulated by the laws of supply and demand, and where those making decisions about the quality of information function as separate, individual nodes of rationality.).
50
This Article focuses on constitutional constraints on the governments regulation of
manipulative speech rather than statutory restraints like Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act, which currently immunizes internet service providers from liability for harm
caused by content published by others. For thoughtful discussion of those statutory barriers
and possibilities for their application and reform, see Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne
Franks, The Internet as a Speech Machine and Other Myths Confounding Section 230 Speech
Reform, 2020 U. CHI. L.F. 45 (2020); Overton, supra note 7; Olivier Sylvain, Recovering
Techs Humanity, 119 COLUM. L. REV. F. 252 (2019).
48
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II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENTS
INTERVENTIONS TO PROTECT LISTENERS FROM MANIPULATION51
Challenging constitutional problems are often difficult because they force us to
choose between important constitutional valuesfor example, between liberty and
security,52 or among speech, religion, and equality.53 With respect to the First
Amendment, the choice is often between speakers and listeners First Amendment
interestsinterests that include autonomy, enlightenment, and democratic selfgovernance.54 This is the case, for instance, when speakers wish to tell lies while their
listeners hunger for the truth; when listeners pine for speakers to reveal information
that speakers would prefer to conceal; and when listeners hope for respite from
speakers resolved to address them.55
Bedrock First Amendment law often privileges speakers interests over listeners
because it presumes that listeners can usually protect themselves from unwelcome
or harmful speech through avoidance and rebuttal.56 At the same time, however, First
Amendment law sometimes permits the governments intervention where asymmetries of power and information between speakers and listeners not only increase the
51

As explained, supra notes 911 and accompanying text, one can plausibly understand
the First Amendments coverage to exclude manipulative practices of the sort discussed here.
This Part assumes arguendo that courts may characterize the sorts of manipulative practices
discussed here as speech covered by the First Amendment and explores the constitutional
implications of that assumption.
52
E.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952) (exploring
the trade-offs between security and liberty when interpreting the scope of the Presidents
inherent Article II authority).
53
See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Commn, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018)
(considering Free Exercise Clause and Free Speech Clause challenges to state antidiscrimination law).
54
See Toni M. Massaro & Helen Norton, Free Speech and Democracy: A Primer for
Twenty-First Century Reformers, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1631, 165860 (2021) (describing
First Amendment values).
55
I have explored a variety of these tensions elsewhere. E.g., Helen Norton, Powerful
Speakers and Their Listeners, 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 441 (2019) (describing asymmetries of
information and power between speakers and interests in several contexts); Helen Norton,
Pregnancy and the First Amendment, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2417 (2019) (examining tensions
between the First Amendment interests of pregnant women seeking reproductive health care
and the speakers who seek to influence them); Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace, supra
note 32 (describing conflicts between employers and workers First Amendment interests);
Helen Norton, Secrets, Lies, and Disclosure, 27 J.L. & POL. 641 (2012) (describing tensions
between speakers and listeners interests in political campaign settings).
56
See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (Those in the Los Angeles courthouse
[offended by a jacket bearing the words Fuck the Draft] could effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes.); Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (If there be time to expose through discussion
the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be
applied is more speech, not enforced silence.).
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likelihood and severity of harm to listeners, but also limit the effectiveness of listeners traditional self-help remedies.57
In these settings, courts sometimes interpret the First Amendment to permit the
government to intervene on listeners behalf by prohibiting false and misleading
speech, requiring speakers to stay away from listeners who prefer to be left alone, or
requiring speakers to make accurate disclosures of material matters.58 In the commercial setting, think of governmental requirements that manufacturers and sellers
affirmatively disclose the costs of, or dangers posed by, their products even when
those speakers would prefer not to reveal that information. 59 And in the context of
public discourse, recall the governments campaign disclosure and disclaimer requirements that serve listeners informational interests in knowing the source of campaign
advertisements and contributionseven though some of those campaign speakers
and contributors would prefer not to disclose their identities.60
In short, inequalities of information and power sometimes matter to First Amendment doctrine. And online manipulative speech, as defined in Part I, inherently
involves such inequalities: those who deploy manipulative interfaces enjoy informational advantages because their ability to collect, aggregate, and analyze data about
their listeners means that they often know more about listeners and their vulnerabilities
than the listeners themselves know.61 These informational advantages also often
draw from, or exacerbate, power advantages.62
57

See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Commn, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980)
(The government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to
inform it.); see also Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn.,
436 U.S. 447 (1978).
58
But not always. See Natl Inst. Fam. and Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018)
(privileging pregnancy service centers autonomy interests as speakers in not disclosing factual
information about the availability and quality of services over pregnant womens interests
as listeners in receiving accurate information that is material to their reproductive decisions).
59
E.g., Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns. of Sup. Ct., 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (upholding commercial disclosure requirements that serve consumers informational interests
as listeners).
60
E.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Commn, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010) (upholding
federal campaign disclosure and disclaimer requirements and noting that transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers
and messages).
61
See Susser, Roessler, & Nissenbaum, supra note 2, at 44 (Further, the threat of online
manipulation presents additional challenges to the predominant model of data regulation in the
United States, which places the full burden of managing information flows and data practices on
individuals. This model assumes that people are aware of the ways data about them is flowing
and the risks and benefits associated with the data practices that implicate them. The emergence
and proliferation of hidden, manipulative online practices pushes beyond the outermost limits
of this approach. Individuals, unaware of the ways data is collected, aggregated, and used to
influence them, simply cannot be left alone to fend off these incursions into their everyday
decision-making.).
62
Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance,
and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149, 1156 (2018) (Big Data
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The First Amendment thus can be understood to permit the government to protect
listeners from manipulation and its harms in settings where listeners cannot protect
themselves because they are unaware of their manipulation. The remainder of this
Part discusses more specifically what this means for manipulative speech in commercial and in political settings.
A. Regulating Manipulative Speech in Commercial Settings
The Supreme Courts longstanding commercial speech doctrine takes a transparently listener-centered approach by treating commercial speech as protected or
unprotected depending on whether it provides value to consumers as listeners. As
Felix Wu explains, Commercial speech protection [] originated in and is justified
by protecting consumers rights to receive commercial information, not in protecting
merchants rights to frame that information.63 Under the Courts framework, the
governments restriction of accurate commercial speech about legal activity (like
accurate speech about prescription drug prices64) triggers courts suspicion in the
form of intermediate scrutiny because such speech is generally valuable to listeners.65
At the same time, the Court treats commercial speech that is false, misleading, or
related to illegal activity as entirely unprotected by the First Amendment because such
speech frustrates listeners interests.66
collects and analyzes information about peopletheir locations, actions, characteristics, and
behaviors. But the people whose information is collected are not necessarily the people who
control the information. Quite the contrary: information about the worlds populations serves
as grist for the mill of computation, analysis, and decisionmaking by governments and large
corporations. Big Data enables new ways of classifying people, making decisions about them,
and exercising power over them.); see also NEIL POSTMAN, TECHNOPOLY: THE SURRENDER
OF CULTURE TO TECHNOLOGY 11 (1992) (advising that we ask to whom will the technology
give greater power and freedom? And whose power and freedom will be reduced by it?);
id. at 13 ([E]mbedded in every tool is an ideological bias, a predisposition to construct the
world as one thing rather than another, to value one thing over another . . . .).
63
Felix T. Wu, Commercial Speech Protection as Consumer Protection, 90 U. COLO. L.
REV. 631, 637 (2019); see also Felix T. Wu, The Commercial Difference, 58 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 2005, 2060 (2017) ([T]he First Amendment imposes no impediment to the government
regulating marketing techniques that unduly take advantage of consumer weaknesses. . . .
[B]ecause the First Amendment value of the solicitation speech lies in its value to the recipient, rather than the speaker, there can be no infringement on First Amendment rights in
a regulation that protects the recipient in that encounter.).
64
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
75663 (1976) (explaining the value of information about prescription drug prices and other
commercial speech to consumer decision-making).
65
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Commn, 447 U.S. 557, 56364 (1980).
66
Id. Despite the contemporary antiregulatory turn in its Free Speech Clause doctrine, the
Court continues to apply this framework to the regulation of commercial speech. E.g., Matal v.
Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 176365 (2017) (discussing commercial speech doctrine with respect
to the governments regulation of trademarks); Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman,
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Writing in 2014, Ryan Calo proposed that courts categorize online manipulation
as commercial speech that is entirely unprotected under this precedent because it is
misleading.67 Although I agree that manipulation can be considered false or misleading (that is, when it seeks to cause the listener to believe a false factual representation
to be true), many manipulative practices instead target and exploit cognitive, emotional,
and other vulnerabilities, rather than make false or misleading representations of fact.68
For this reason, the Courts current commercial speech framework is incomplete
in its failure to address a large volume of manipulative (yet not deceptive) commercial
speech, especially in online environments.69 To fill this doctrinal lacuna, I propose that
the Court should refine and extend current commercial speech doctrine to add manipulative commercial speech to the commercial speech that it already treats as unprotected by the First Amendment. This move tracks the theoretical justifications of
the commercial speech doctrine as steeped in protecting listeners First Amendment
interests.70 When one recalls that false and misleading commercial speech, as well
as commercial speech related to illegal activity, loses its First Amendment protection
137 S. Ct. 1144, 1151 (2017) (discussing commercial speech doctrine with respect to the governments regulation of retailers communication about prices).
67
Calo, supra note 9, at 103839. For a related but distinct take on manipulative marketing
outside of the digital context, see Micah L. Berman, Manipulative Marketing and the First
Amendment, 103 GEO. L.J. 497, 501 (2015) (contending that the Central Hudson commercial
speech framework addresses only informational advertising and asserting that noninformational
marketing practices that manipulate consumersand particularly marketing practices that
seek to subconsciously influence consumer decisionmakingshould be entitled to limited,
if any, First Amendment protection). Berman focuses on noninformational marketing that
takes the form of product placement and package coloring. See id. at 52633.
68
See Luguri & Strahilevitz, supra note 39, at 90 (describing techniques like nagging, price
comparison prevention, intermediate currency, toying with emotion, or confirmshaming).
69
Calo suggested that online manipulation might also be characterized as coercive, and
thus unprotected by the First Amendment for that reason as well. Calo, supra note 9, at
103839. But recall that manipulation and its harms are conceptually distinct from coercion:
manipulation is sneaky, coercion is not. See supra notes 810 and accompanying text; David
C. Vladeck, Digital Marketing, Consumer Protection, and the First Amendment: A Brief Reply
to Professor Ryan Calo, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 156, 16667 (2014) (doubting that
the effects of online marketing can accurately be described as coercive).
70
If courts decline the invitation to treat manipulative commercial speech as entirely
unprotected, then Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny would apply to the governments regulation of such manipulative commercial speech. Even so, appropriately designed regulations
may still survive this scrutiny. See Greater Phila. Chamber of Com. v. City of Philadelphia,
949 F.3d 116, 15457 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that the citys law prohibiting employers inquiries
about applicants salary history survived Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny); King v.
Gen. Info. Servs., Inc., 903 F. Supp. 2d 303, 30405, 30708, 31011, 313 (E.D. Pa. 2012)
(holding that the Fair Credit Reporting Act requirement that credit reports exclude outdated
arrest record information survived Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny); Berman, supra
note 67, at 54146 (describing how the governments regulation of noninformational marketing, like product placement and package coloring, to protect consumers from manipulation
could satisfy intermediate scrutiny).
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precisely because that speech frustrates listeners First Amendment interests, one
sees that the same can be true of manipulative commercial speech: it frustrates listeners interests by seeking to covertly influence those listeners choices to the speakers advantage without their conscious awareness and by targeting and exploiting
their vulnerabilities.71
Filling this doctrinal lacuna would also help fill enforcement lacunae within
current law. Even though existing consumer protection statutes often prohibit unfair
as well as deceptive trade practices, 72 to date [u]nfairness has been the basis for
decision in only a handful of litigated cases73largely because of the conceptual
difficulty in defining and describing illegally unfair practices.74 Here too Susser,
Roessler, and Nissenbaum give us the conceptual tools to help understand why
manipulationthat is, speakers hidden efforts to shape listeners decision-making
that target and exploit those listeners vulnerabilities in ways that the targets are not
consciously aware ofis unfair to consumers even when it is hard to characterize
as deceptive.75
This doctrinal move would also support the constitutionality of new legislation
if it were to be enacted. A variety of recent legislative proposals seek to regulate
manipulative online practices of the sort described here. Examples include the
Deceptive Experiences To Online Users Reduction Act, which proposes to prohibit
interfaces designed with the purpose or substantial effect of obscuring, subverting,
or impairing user autonomy, decision-making, or choice to obtain consent or user
data; practices that subdivide or segment consumers of online services into groups
for the purposes of behavioral or psychological experiments or studies, except with
the informed consent of each user involved; and practices that cultivate childrens
71

Note that workers as well as consumers are vulnerable to manipulative commercial
speech. See Susser, Roessler & Nissenbaum, supra note 2, at 79 (observing how algorithms
deployed in the gig economy can manipulate workers choices).
72
15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (defining a trade practice to be illegally unfair if it causes or is likely
to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers
themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition).
73
Michael M. Greenfield, Unfairness Under Section 5 of the FTC Act and Its Impact on
State Law, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1869, 1877 (2000); see also Coburn Keegan & Calli Schroeder,
Unpacking Unfairness: The FTCs Evolving Measures of Privacy Harms, 15 J.L. ECON. & POLY
19, 1920 (2019) (explaining the FTCs primary reliance on deception rather than unfairness).
74
See Willis, supra note 6, at 120 (noting thorny questions about when marketing crosses
from fair persuasion to unfair or abusive manipulation and the lack of societal consensus
on where to draw the line). Given the lack of enforcement activity, [t]here is virtually no legal
authority addressing the question of whether commercial speech that satisfies the FTCs test
for unfairness, but is neither misleading nor deceptive, is protected by the First Amendment.
Luguri & Strahilevitz, supra note 39, at 100. Treating manipulative commercial speech as
unprotectedakin to false and misleading commercial speechwould, of course, resolve
this question.
75
Note that unfairness may be an even more capacious term than manipulation; for
example, coercive sales tactics can be unfair even if not manipulative as the term is used in
this Article.
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compulsive platform usage.76 As examples of such interfaces or practices, the bills
cosponsors pointed to:
[A] sudden interruption during the middle of a task repeating
until the user agrees to consent; a deliberate obscuring of alternative choices or settings through design or other means; or the
use of privacy settings that push users to agree as the default
option, while users looking for more privacy-friendly options
often must click through a much longer process, detouring through
multiple screens.77
The bill proposes to treat such practices as violations of the Federal Trade Commissions rule defining an unfair or deceptive act or practice under . . . the Federal
Trade Commission Act.78
Treating manipulative commercial speech as unprotected by the First Amendment
then requires that we have a workable principle for identifying such manipulative
commercial speech. The remainder of this subpart explores two possibilities.
1. Focusing on Manipulative Effects
One approach to identifying manipulative (and thus unprotected) commercial
speech is to require evidence of its manipulative success.
Recall that manipulative interfaces and other online practices are the products
of conscious design choices, carefully studied and tested to maximize their effectiveness in shaping targets choices without those targets conscious awareness.79 This
means that academics and regulators can also measure their effects. Testing by legal
76

S. 1084, 116th Cong. § 3(a)(1) (2019).
Press Release, The Office of United States Senator Deb Fischer, Senators Introduce
Bipartisan Legislation to Ban Manipulative Dark Patterns (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.fischer
.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2019/4/senators-introduce-bipartisan-legislation-to-ban-manipu
lative-dark-patterns [https://perma.cc/GC9B-99KM]. For a related proposal under consideration
in the European Union, see Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council Laying Down Harmonized Rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence
Act) and Amending Certain Union Legislative Acts, at 1213, COM (2021) 206 final (Apr. 21,
2021) (proposing to ban artificial intelligence systems with significant potential to manipulate
persons through subliminal techniques beyond their consciousness or exploit vulnerabilities
of specific vulnerable groups such as children or persons with disabilities in order to materially
distort their [behavior] in a manner that is likely to cause them or another person psychological
or physical harm).
78
S. 1084, 116th Cong. § 3(d) (2019).
79
See Langvardt, supra note 9, at 142 (Aza Raskin, inventor of the infinite scroll at Mozilla,
told interviewers that behind every phone screen, there are about a thousand engineers who work
on increasing addictiveness.).
77
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scholars Luguri and Strahilevitz, for instance, found certain interfaces to double,
triple, sometimes even quadruple consumers willingness to accept sellers offers
and requests compared to neutral choice architecture: [o]ur bottom line is that dark
patterns are strikingly effective in getting consumers to do what they would not do
when confronted with more neutral user interfaces.80 These design choices include
interfaces that obscure options that are popular to consumers but less lucrative for
sellers, minimize material information with smaller print in less prominent locations,
or require users to jump through numerous hoops to reject or withdraw from a service
or product (so-called roach motels).81 Luguri and Strahilevitz thus recommend that
regulators engage in testing of their own to identify manipulative interfaces82that
is, design choices that should trigger regulatory interventions because of their measurably stark effects on consumers decisions.
Indeed, algorithmic manipulation at times may be easier to identify and measure
and thus responsibly regulatethan that by manipulative humans. [D]ark patterns
are different from other forms of dodgy business practices because of the scale of
e-commerce. There may be poetic justice in the fact that this very scale presents an
opportunity for creative legal regulators, Luguri and Strahilevitz note.83 Now that
scholars can test dark patterns, we can isolate causation in a way thats heretofore
been impossible in the brick-and-mortar world. Unlike brick-and-mortar manipulation, dark patterns are hiding in plain sight, operate on a massive scale, and are
relatively easy to detect.84
Of course, we can imagine challenges in identifying baselines for neutral choice
architecture. (But, as Luguri and Strahilevitz note, that is not always the case: It
should not be hard to generate consensus around the idea that a simple Yes/No or
Accept/Decline prompt is neutral, provided the choices are presented with identical
fonts, colors, font sizes, and placement.)85 Effects-based approaches to identifying
illegally manipulative practices may also invite objections that comparisons to socalled neutral baselines rely on a contested liberal understanding of the autonomous
self that assumes that our preferences are stable: in other words, our preferences are
80

Luguri & Strahilevitz, supra note 39, at 46 (emphasis omitted); see also Becher &
Feldman, supra note 34, at 49799 (proposing an evidence-based approach to regulating
market manipulations that involves regulators testing in laboratory settings to assess designs
manipulative success as well as users awareness (or lack thereof) of those effects).
81
Luguri & Strahilevitz, supra note 39, at 4950, 52.
82
Id. at 4445.
83
Id. at 48; see also id. (It is exceedingly difficult to figure out whether a door-to-door
salespersons least savory tactics significantly affected the chances of a purchasewas the
verbal sleight of hand material or incidental? Who knows? But with e-commerce, firms run
thousands of consumers through identical interfaces at a reasonable cost and see how small
software tweaks might alter user behavior. Social scientists working in academia or for the
government can do this too; we just havent done so before today.).
84
Id.
85
Id. at 98.
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not always consistent and, in fact, can be shaped by algorithms and other forces,
both technological and otherwise.86
For these reasons, rather than (or in addition to) focusing on manipulative success,
we might identify manipulative (and thus unprotected) commercial speech as that
involving certain manipulative characteristics that signal the intent and tendency to
interfere with our choices, an effort that we might objectively view as harmful in
and of itself. The next section explores this possibility.
2. Focusing on Manipulative Features
A second approach to identifying commercial speech that is manipulative (and thus
unprotected by the First Amendment) focuses on design choices that display the three
characteristics of manipulation as defined by Susser, Roessler, and Nissenbaum
hidden efforts that target and exploit users vulnerabilities:
[W]e should attempt to determine whether the influencer was
trying to conceal their efforts, whether the influence was intended
to exploit the manipulees vulnerabilities, and to what extent the
influence was targeted. Manipulative practicescharacterized,
as we have argued, by concealment, exploitation of vulnerabilities, and targetingare cause for concern, regardless of whether
they succeed in every instance.87
To be sure, much more work remains to be done in defining each of these three
characteristics more precisely. But to start I will suggest hidden to mean not apparent to the user; target to mean identifying specific users with certain vulnerabilities;
and exploit to mean deliberately deploying knowledge of those vulnerabilities in
settings where theres reason to believe it will shape users choices to the speakers
advantage. In other words, we can understand a speakers choice to deploy designs
with features that display these manipulative characteristics as a proxy for that
choices tendency to manipulate those listeners.88 Such a regulatory focus on risk of
86

See Ian Kerr, The Devil Is in the Defaults, 4 CRITICAL ANALYSIS L. 91, 92 (2017); Susser,
Roessler & Nissenbaum, supra note 2, at 4 (relying on philosophical accounts of sociallysituated, relational autonomy); see also Julie Cohen, What Privacy is For, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1904, 1907, 1909 (2013) (describing conceptions of the idealized liberal self that possesses
both abstract liberty rights and the capacity for rational deliberation and choice and is capable
of exercising its capacities in ways uninfluenced by cultural context and identifying the need
for a postliberal theory of selfhoodone capacious enough to accommodate the full spectrum
of relational, emergent subjectivity).
87
See Susser, Roessler & Nissenbaum, supra note 2, at 41.
88
See Cohen, supra note 9, at 655 (In the context of platform-based, massively intermediated environments, the legal system should be less concerned with intentionality as to
specific pieces of contenta lens that inevitably implicates the state in choice of political
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harm (rather than causation) is by no means unprecedented in the consumer protection
context. The Federal Trade Commission, for instance, identifies commercial advertisements as deceptive by focusing not on a showing that they actually cause consumer
deception, but instead on a showing that they are likely to mislead a reasonable
consumer and that those representations are material (and thus likely to cause injury
to the consumer).89
B. Regulating Manipulative Speech in Political Settings
While manipulation in commercial settings threatens harm to individual consumers, online manipulation in public discourse additionally threatens collective harm
to our democratic self-governance. When citizens are targets of online manipulation
and voter decisions rather than purchase decisions are swayed by hidden influence,
democracy itself is called into question, Susser, Roessler, and Nissenbaum observe.90
Add to this the fact that the tools of online manipulation are concentrated in only
a few hands, and it is easy to see how the nexus of influence and information technology stands to make already problematic power dynamics far worse.91
Recall, for instance, Cambridge Analyticas use of big data to microtarget messages to specific voters in efforts to influence those voters choices in the 2016 U.S.
elections.92 Authoritarians and others similarly seek to exploit the manipulative possibilities enabled by twenty-first-century platforms in ways that threaten democracy, as
Julie Cohen explains:
Authoritarian information systems have developed sophisticated
information strategies that leverage platform-based environments
to undermine common knowledge about how democratic institutions function and, by extension, to destabilize the behavioral
norms that lend such institutions continuing legitimacy. Such
attacks, which are now well-documented, exploit platform capabilities for microtargeting, automaticity, and cascading, sociallynetworked information spread to stoke conspiracy theories and
foster distrustof government, of the mainstream media, of
scientific consensus around topics such as climate change and
the efficacy of vaccines, and so on. Powerful domestic factions that
preferencesand more concerned with a deliberate design orientation that privileges automatic,
habitual response and reflexive amplification.).
89
See FED. TRADE COMMN, ENFORCEMENT POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTIVELY FORMATTED ADVERTISEMENTS 12 (2015).
90
Susser, Roessler & Nissenbaum, supra note 2, at 43.
91
Id. at 4344.
92
See Ido Kilovaty, Legally Cognizable Manipulation, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 449,
46768 (2019).
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should have mobilized to defend these assaults on our foundational institutions instead have adopted weaponization techniques
to further their own ends. As such strategies become more powerful, they produce and amplify modes of public discourse about
institutional actors that are incompatible with the knowledge
structure of a stable democracy.93
The existential democratic threats posed by todays manipulative online practices
thus may now outweigh the traditional dangers of the governments regulation of
speech in public discourse.94
Of course, speakers efforts to manipulate listeners decisions about voting and
other core political activity occur in the realm not of commercial speech but instead
in public discourse, an area where courts suspicion of governments regulatory
interventions is considerably greater (and understandably so) than in the commercial
context.95 Under the Courts longstanding First Amendment doctrine, the governments
content-neutral regulation of speech (that is, its regulation of expressions time, place,
or manner rather than its content) in public discourse triggers a form of intermediate
scrutiny,96 while the governments content-based regulation triggers strict scrutiny.97
(To be sure, some suggest that the threats to free speech and democracy posed in the
twenty-first-century speech environment should inspire tweaks, and perhaps even
93

Cohen, supra note 9, at 659.
Id. at 66162.
95
See Jack M. Balkin, Keynote Address at the Association for Computing Machinery Symposium on Computer Science and Law: How to Regulate (and Not Regulate) Social Media
(Oct. 28, 2019) (transcript available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=3484114 [https://perma.cc/5N9V-FEA6]) (defining public sphere as the space in which
people express opinions and exchange views that judge what is going on in society).
96
See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (explaining
that the governments content-neutral restrictions of speech survive First Amendment review
so long as they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that
they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave
open ample alternative channels for communication of the information).
97
See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 84455 (2006) (explaining the application of strict scrutiny, which requires the government to show that its intervention is narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling interest). For an example of the governments content-based
regulation of public discourse to serve listeners interests that survived strict scrutiny, see
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (upholding a towns ban on the distribution
of campaign literature within 100 feet of polling places to prevent voters coercion and harassment). And for thoughtful discussion of how existing doctrine can be, and sometimes is,
applied to sensibly balance competing constitutional values, see Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test
That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L.
REV. 783 (2007); Ashutosh Bhagwat, In Defense of Content Regulation, 102 IOWA L. REV.
1427 (2017).
94
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topples, to this doctrine.)98 In any event, the challenge is to cabin the governments
considerable potential for overreach through appropriately tailored regulation of
manipulative speech.
To this end, the government can tailor its intervention through its choice of
regulatory target (i.e., what it targets for regulation), through its choice of regulatory
tool (i.e., how it regulates its target), or both.99
1. Tailoring Through Targeting
As explained in the preceding subpart, appropriately tailored interventions could
target interfaces with certain manipulative effects, certain manipulative features, or
both.
First, interventions could target interfaces with particularly stark manipulative
effects through AB testing (where an A/B test randomly distributes an A version
of something to some people and a B version to others and measures differences
between the responses of the two groups).100 Indeed, those who design and deploy
these features engage in this sort of testing themselves to identify effective means
for influencing users choices to click on, read, or forward specific content in
political as well as commercial settings101: online actors deploy these manipulative
interfaces precisely because theyve tested them extensively and know they are effective in changing their targets choices.102 (In political settings, however, the causal
98

E.g., Massaro & Norton, supra note 54, at 1638 (proposing a framework for assessing
when and why the First Amendment permits carefully designed regulations of speech to further
free speech and democracy values); Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, EMERGING
THREATS 2, 17 (2017), https://s3.amazonaws.com/kfai-documents/documents/5d8a0f848d/Is-the
-First-Amendment-Obsolete-.pdf [https://perma.cc/5L8T-HLCY] (suggesting that we imagine
how First Amendment doctrine might adapt to the speech pathologies in the twenty-first-century
environment). Justice Breyer, for instance, has long urged courts and policymakers to more
frankly balance the harms of the governments regulation of speech against the harms that
speech sometimes threatens. See, e.g., Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2304 (2019) (Breyer,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (I believe we would do better to treat this
Courts speech-related categories not as outcome-determinative rules, but instead as rules of
thumb.); United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 731 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring) ([S]ome
such approach is necessary if the First Amendment is to offer proper protection in the many
instances in which a statute adversely affects constitutionally protected interests but warrants
neither near-automatic condemnation (as strict scrutiny implies) nor near near-automatic
approval (as is implicit in rational basis review).).
99
See Langvardt, supra note 9, at 153 ([T]he regulatory response should escalate with
the sense of urgency. Light-touch responses would try to help consumers make good decisions.
More dramatic responses would simply disable products most dangerous features.).
100
Willis, supra note 6, at 127 n.52.
101
Id. at 12728.
102
See Cohen, supra note 49, at 165 (Networked environments configured to optimize
data harvesting and surplus extraction operateand are systematically designed to operate
in ways that preclude even the most perceptive and reasonable consumer from evaluating the
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relationship between design and outcome may be considerably more contested, as
the decision whether or for whom to vote can be more causally complex than the
decision to decide whether to buy a product or agree to a transactional condition.)
Second, interventions could instead target [m]anipulative practicescharacterized, as we have argued, by concealment, exploitation of vulnerabilities, and
targeting[as] cause for concern, regardless of whether they succeed in every
instance.103 Along these lines, Julie Cohen emphasizes that [t]he First Amendment
does not require legislators or judges to privilege design for automaticity and reflexive
amplification;104 she identifies particularly manipulative features in public discourse
to include predictive profiling and microtargeting based on behavioral and psychographic data; interface design to elicit automatic, precognitive responses; and algorithmic optimization to amplify patterns of cascading, socially-networked spread.105
2. Tailoring Through Tools
Moving from the question of what to regulate (target) to the question of how to
regulate (tool), this section highlights a few suggestions offered by thoughtful commentators; my objective here is to introduce a range of possibilities for further consideration and exploration rather than to detail (much less exhaust) them. In thinking
through these and other available options, recall that the choice of tool drives the level
of suspicion under the Courts First Amendment doctrine: tools characterized as
content-neutral receive only intermediate scrutiny, as compared to the strict scrutiny
generally applied to the governments content-based regulation of protected speech.106
Kyle Langvardt, for instance, has described a variety of friction-creating restrictions of manipulative interfaces, like restrictions on infinite scrolls (that unceasingly
feed users with new posts); restrictions on autoplay features that seek to manipulate
users into remaining online for longer periods of time (during which time users
spend more money and shed more data); and restrictions that limit or delay users
ability to mass-forward (and thus amplify) content.107
goods or services on offer. Predictive profiling seeks to minimize the need to persuade by
targeting directly those potential customers most strongly predisposed to buy and appealing to
everything that is known about those customers habits and predilections.).
103
Susser, Roessler & Nissenbaum, supra note 2, at 41; see also id. at 27 (recognizing the
difficulties of proving causation and thus focusing on the concept of manipulative practices
strategies that a reasonable person should expect to result in manipulationand not on the
success concept of manipulation, in toto).
104
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with broad-based content-neutral restrictions in its WhatsApp and Messenger products on users
ability to mass-forward content. Twitter has experimented with a feature that would ask for
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Lauren Willis urges that law compel businesses to engage in fair marketing by
design by, for example, requiring that platforms or retailers refrain from directing
materials to consumers whose demographics or behaviors indicate persistent or
transitory impairment.108 Ian Kerr suggests that technological defaults ought to be
regulated in a manner similar to contractual defaults, urging that the strictest privacy
settings automatically apply once a customer acquires a new product or service,
such that users need make no manual change to their privacy settings to protect
themselves to the fullest.109 And Woody Hartzog, who has written extensively on how
law should better reflect how design influences our perceptions and actions, 110
urges regulators to discourage design that tricks us, lies to us, exploits us . . . . and
advises courts and regulators to ferret out abusive design that seeks to exploit users
biases and vulnerabilities.111
In sum, recognizing the harm of online manipulation in political settings does
not tell us how to address that harm. Although much work remains to be done in
developing appropriate responses, this Part has identified some possibilities for
consideration.
CONCLUSION
Some may fear the governments restriction of manipulative interfaces, viewing
such restriction as unacceptably paternalistic. But paternalism describes interference
with autonomous choices that others think unwise, rather than interference with practices that themselves frustrate autonomous choice.112 Precisely because manipulations targets are unaware of the ways in which online actors gather, aggregate, and
exploit their data to influence their decision-making, online manipulation occurs in a
setting that defies the traditional First Amendment model of fully informed rational
listeners freely choosing among available options. In other words, nobody consciously
chooses to be manipulated (as the term is used in this Article) because, by definition,
targets are unaware of their manipulation, and thus cant take steps to protect themselves. As Langvardt observes, [i]f the regulatory goal is simply to make product
design less manipulative, then regulation in principle exists to enhance rather than
diminish tech users freedom of choice.113
confirmationsuggesting that [y]ou can read the article on Twitter before Retweetingwhen
a user attempts to retweet a news article seconds after seeing it.).
108
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110
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Others may worry that any effort to regulate manipulation is folly because manipulation is endemic to the human condition. But so too are violence, discrimination,
and falsehoodsand yet government restricts each of those choices at times precisely
because of the harms they inflict.114 Rather than ask whether to regulate these alltoo-human behaviors, the better question is when, why, and how to regulate them.
To this end, this Article suggests that ethicists understanding of manipulation
and its harms offers helpful tools for thinking more carefully about legal and policy
responses.115 Relying upon these tools, I propose that courts should add manipulation to the list of harms to listeners interests that sometimes justify the governments intervention in certain settings consistent with the First Amendment.
More specifically, one can understand manipulative commercial speech to be
entirely unprotected by the First Amendment, with the governments regulation
subject only to rational-basis scrutiny. Like commercial speech that is false, misleading, or related to illegal activityand thus treated as unprotected by the First
Amendment116manipulative commercial speech frustrates rather than furthers
listeners First Amendment interests. This leaves open possibilities for identifying
commercial speech as manipulative (and thus unprotected by the First Amendment)
by focusing on its effects (i.e., its manipulative success), its design (i.e., its deployment of certain manipulative features), or both. And although First Amendment
doctrine appropriately poses a considerably larger barrier to the regulation of
manipulative speech in political settings, there too we can understand the First
Amendment to permit certain interventions that are carefully tailored in terms of
regulatory target, regulatory tool, or both.117
Many may understandably wonder whether the contemporary Court will be
receptive to these ideas, given the antiregulatory turn in its First Amendment doctrine,118
along with its inconsistent attention to the ways in which twenty-first-century
technologies inflict harms that are different in degree and sometimes in kind from
114
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earlier counterparts.119 Even so, as constitutional law scholar Mark Graber reminded
us in another context: Advocating doctrines unlikely to be accepted immediately
is still a worthwhile activity.120 Indeed, the challenges posed by twenty-firstcentury expressive technologies may inspire more careful reflection about how to
define and mitigate the harmful effects of covered speech, while preserving its
manifold benefits.121
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